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The contract, under which software is transferred, is often known as
a software contract. The classification of such a contract is still debatable
in many legal systems. This is most likely due to its unique nature in terms
of the transferee's limited authority and the intangibility of the computer
programme (software). A software transaction usually involves two
elements, namely, the supply of software and its licence. It is still
controversial whether these two elements are embedded in one or two
contracts.
Classifying a software contract as one type of contract or another
may have significant legal consequences. At the international level
classifying a software contract as a sale contract will make it fall under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with Goods ("GATT") whereas
classifying it as a service contract will make it fall under the General
Agreement on Trade and Service ("GATS"). Furthermore, the United
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods ("CISG") applies
only to sale of goods contracts and, hence, classification of a software
contract is necessary for determining its applicability.
At the national level the application of certain domestic rules, e.g.,
implied terms, consumer protection, etc., may depend on the type of
contract. While the law provides warranties as to the quality of goods sold,
there are no such warranties in the case of a service contract, under which
services are supplied with reasonable care and skill.
This paper seeks to find out whether a software contract can be
classified under the traditional method of classification adopted in English
law or as a new type of contract governed by common-law rules. If the
latter possibility becomes our choice, the next question will naturally be
whether a new legislation is needed to deal with such a contract. The
United States ("US") Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act is a
model of such legislation and, hence, studying its applicability and scope
is necessary in this work. The last part of this paper examines the
applicability of the CISG to a software contract as it is the well-known




Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
Classification Under English Law
Contracts are classified as sale of goods or supply of services
depending on the substance of each contract. The contract is for service if
its substance is to exercise skill and labour for the production of an article
provided that materials used are ancillary; on the other hand, if the contract
involves a transfer of property in goods, the contract will be a contract of
sale. In Robinson v. Graves,1 Greer LJ. stated:
If you find, as they did in Lee v. Griffin, that the substance of the
contract was the production of something to be sold by the
dentist to the dentist's customer, then that is a sale of goods. But
if the substance of the contract, on the other hand, is that skill
and labour have to be exercised for the production of the article
and it is only ancillary to that there will pass from the artist to his
client or customer some materials in addition to the skill
involved in the production of the portrait, that does not make any
difference to the result, because the substance of the contract is
the skill and experience of the artist in producing the picture.2
It is still debatable whether or not a software contract falls under this
traditional classification. The issue of classification in cases of fixing or
updating software issue seems to be less confusing than in cases where the
transaction involves the transfer of software. On the face of it, the former
transaction is for services. Nevertheless, a programmer who contracts to
update or fix the software of an electronic system may need to transfer
supplementary software in addition to the services supplied. If this
becomes the case, the contract will include a supply of software and
service.
It is worth noting that the service of the supplier to ensure that the
software supplied is properly functioning should not affect the
classification of a software contract. This service is nothing more than
ensuring that the software is of conforming quality. However, it must be
noted that English cases show that warranty of quality of software receives
I [1935] 1 K.B. 579.
2 Rohinson v. Graves [1935] 1 K.B. 579, 587. In the leading case, Lee v. Griffin (1861) I B. & S. 272, Crompton
J., at p.275, pointed out that " ... where the contract is for a chattel to be made and delivered, it clearly is a
contract for the sale of goods. There are some cases in which the supply of the materials is ancillary to the
contract, as in the case of a printer supplying the paper on which a book is printed".
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special treatment. In Saphena Computing Ltd. v. Allied Collection
Agencies Ltd. 3 it was held that software was not a commodity which was
delivered once, only once and for all, but one which would necessarily be
accompanied by a degree of testing and modification. Although this
decision may bring about justice in cases of custom-designed software, it
is difficult to imagine how it can apply to cases of standard software. The
customer who obtains standard software from a retailer or downloads it
on-line expects it to be immediately ready for its general use. This work is
not intended to deal with the liability for defective software but it is
initially submitted that the court should be cautious in applying the
decision in Saphena to future cases of standard software.
Software can be classified as standard and custom-designed.
Standard software is normally manufactured as copies designed for
unlimited number of users whereas custom-designed software is specially
designed and programmed for the particular needs of only one user.4 Both
types of software, it is submitted, should be classified similarly. Under the
contract of custom-designed software, the party who orders the software
does not provide more than information about the intended use of the
ordered software and does not pay for intellectual efforts in producing the
software. This case is not much different from the case where the buyer
orders machinery to be specially manufactured for his particular needs
without supplying the seller with raw materials; here, the contract is still
classified as a sale of goods. Indeed, as an American court put it, the
extensive services rendered in producing the custom-designed software are
necessary for achieving the ready-to-usc programme as the final product.5
In discussing the issue of classification of software contracts, it does
not seem appropriate to argue whether a software contract can be classified
as a lease contract. A lease contract enables the lessee to use a chattel for
an agreed period of time. Definitely, a software contract is not a lease
contract for three main reasons. Firstly, software is usually provided as a
copy and more copies may be delivered to others whereas, under a lease
contract, the lessee receives the article itself; secondly, under a lease
contract the lessee is obligated to return the article whereas under a
software contract the transferee retains the software; thirdly, the transferee
can usually retain the software for an unlimited period of time whereas,
3 [1995] F.S.R. 616.
4 F. Diedrich, "Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law via Autonomous Interpretation: Software
Contracts and the CISG", (1996) 8 Pace Int'I L. Rev. 303,326-327.
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under a lease contract, the lessee has the right to use the article for a
limited period of time.
Needless to say, classification of an access contract is beyond this
debate. Under an access contract, a party is granted access to a database.
Such a contract does not involve any sale; the essence of such a transaction
is the service provided by the owner of the database. There is no transfer
of a property right in a movable object. There is no doubt that such a
contract is a service contract.
The discussion above leads to the question of whether a software
contract can be considered as a sale or service contract or a contract that
does not fall under this traditional classification. Whether or not the
classification is affected by the means of delivery of the software is a
central issue.
I. Types of Software Delivery
Software can be transferred physically or electronically.
Furthermore, software can be embedded in machinery. The following will
deal with the issue of classification in relation to the major methods of
software delivery.
A. Software Delivered via Physical Means
Software may be embedded in a machine for the purpose of its
functionality. In most cases, the buyer of the machine has no knowledge of
the existence of the software. Software may also be saved on a physical
medium for the purpose of its delivery. The following will deal with each
type of delivery separately in order to find out how a software contract can
be classified in each case.
1. Software Embedded in Machinery
Software is intangible; being embedded in hardware does not make
it tangible.6 While hardware is necessary to execute software, software is
still a set of instructions that are capable of such execution.? Software may
6 On the contrary, Plotkin argues that, "although software is often described as 'intangible' or 'abstract',
executable software stored in the memory of a computer is in fact a physical component of the computeL" R,
Plotkin, "From Idea to Action: Toward a Unified Theory of Software and the Law" (2003) 17 Int'!
RevLComputers & Teck 337, 338,
7 Ihid, at p, 338,
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be embedded in machines, such as televisions, cars, etc, for the sake of
their functionality. Here, software, it is submitted, must be dealt with as
part of the subject-matter of the contract, under which the machinery is
delivered. This is justified on the ground that the purpose of the transaction
is to obtain the proper functionality of the hardware and not the software
itself. In such cases, the customer usually does not obtain a licence for the
software. Indeed, the machinery is not just a physical medium for the
delivery of software.
The situation may be different in cases of a computer system that
comprises both hardware and software. Here, as Bradgate suggests, the
customer obtains (a) property in the hardware and (b) a licence to use the
pre-loaded software.8 The Australian court seems to have a different view.
In Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v. Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd. 9
the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that a sale of a computer
system, comprising both hardware and software, was a sale of goods. IO Sir
lain Glidewell LJ, in St. Albans City and District Council v. International
Computers Ltd, 11 accepted this view but his comments were obiter.
In cases of computer system transactions, a distinction can be drawn
between operating system software, e.g., Windows, and application
software, e.g., Microsoft Office. While the former is used to operate the
computer, the latter is executed by the computer for certain functionality.
The operating system embedded in a computer must follow, it is
submitted, the type of contract under which the whole computer system is
delivered. This is similar to the case where software is embedded in a car
or television. However, in cases of application software, the customer, it is
submitted, will be involved in two contractual relationships, namely, sale
of hardware and supply of software. It should be noted that the distinction
between these kinds of software does not come into the picture where
software is delivered separately via a physical medium, as discussed
below.
x R. Bradgate. "Beyond the Millennium - The Legal Issues: Sale of Goods Issues and the Millennium Bug"
1999 (2) The Journal 0/ Information, Law and Technology (JILT), section 3.3. Available at
<http://www.law.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/99-2/bradgate.html>.
9 [1983] 2 NSWLR 48.
10 Tohy Constructions Products Ply Ltd v. Computa Bar (Sale,) Ply Ltd. [1983] 2 NSWLR 48,54.
It [1996] 4 All E.R. 481.
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2. Software Incorporated in Physical Medium
Inconsistency among legal writers can be found in cases where the
physical medium (such as floppy diskettes and CDs), is used for the
purpose of delivering software. The physical medium, on which the
software is stored, can be obtained directly from the programmer but it is
more often obtained from a retailer. In cases of obtaining the software
directly from the programmer, one can envisage three possible
classifications of the transaction, namely, a sale of goods contract, a
transaction consisting of two contracts, and an innominate contract
governed by the common-law rules of contract law. These possibilities
will be examined in detail.
Under a sale of goods contract, the seller must deliver goods, hand
over any document related to them and transfer the property in the goods
sold whereas the buyer is bound to pay the price and take delivery of
goods. Delivering a diskette containing software for a price is, on the face
of it, a sale of goods. However, this is unrealistic because the value of the
physical medium is usually trivial to consider here. The transferee is
interested in the software rather than in the physical medium used for its
delivery. Brennan distinguishes between the goods-centric image and the
information-centric image. He states:
The goods-centric image sees a software transaction as a
delivery of this particular CD. It makes the medium the
message, the container the content and the CD the computer
programme. The information-centric view sees just the
opposite. The essence of the transaction is the legal
authorization to use the programme; the CD is just the means
to enable that use. One needs a jar to carry caviar, but that does
not make the jar the essence of the meal. l2
Indeed, the physical medium contammg the software is like the
container of a physical commodity that a customer purchases from a
retailer. The transferee looks at the functionality of the software and the
scope of the authorised use.
It may be argued that a defective medium may cause trouble in
running the software and, as a result, this may raise the programmer's
liability on the ground of defective software resulting from the defective
12 L. Brennan, "Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions" (2000) 38 Duquense L. R. 459, Section
I-B. Available at <http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd~261912>.
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physical medium. However, strictly speaking, this does not make the
medium the subject-matter of the transaction. This can simply be
understood by comparing a software transaction, where software is
delivered via a physical medium, with a sale of goods contract, where
physical goods require proper packing for delivery. In the latter case the
packing material is incidental and not the subject-matter of the transaction.
Nevertheless, if the goods are damaged due to defective packing, the buyer
will sue for defective goods. By analogy, the physical medium used for
delivering the software should not be dealt with separately. Saying
otherwise will make the subject-matter of the transaction the container (the
physical medium) and the software incidental. This is far away from the
reality of the transaction.
In view of this, can the transaction be classified as a sale of
software? There seem to be two main aspects that distinguish a software
contract from a sale of goods contract. Firstly, under a sale of goods
contract the buyer is, in principle, free to use the goods bought or resell
them or dispose of them without any restriction. This may not exist in a
software contract where the customer is governed by licence terms,
whereby he is usually granted certain proprietary rights l3 and not complete
ownership.14 In other words, under a software contract, the transferee will
be concerned with two elements, namely, a licence to use the software and
a defect-free performance of the software, while a under sale of goods
contract the buyer is only interested in the conforming goods since he does
not need a licence to utilise the goods. It can be argued that a software
contract may include a term that allows the transferee to copy or re-
transfer the software; hence, the difference between a software contract
and a sale of goods contract vanishes. However, it should be noted that,
under a sale of goods contract, the buyer's authority to resell does not need
a special agreement between the parties for that effect; indeed, this
authority is the usual effect of the sale contract. 15 Under a software
contract, this authority needs to be agreed upon.
13 The maker may issue a general public licence that provides for distribution of a source code and allow
downstream users to copy. modify, and re-distribute the code. See D. McGowan, "Legal Implications of Open-
Source Software" (Undated), available at the website of the Social Science Research Network
<http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id~243237>.
14 The use of software, from a technical point of view, involves making a copy of it. That occurs whenever the
software is loaded by a computer. See J. Carter, "Article 2B: International Perspectives" (1999) 14 JeL 54, 59.
15 Section 2 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 states "(I) A contract of sale of goods is a contract by which the
seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called the
price ... (4) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer
the contact is called a sale. (5) Where under a contract of sale the transfer of the property in the goods is to take
49
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
The second main aspect of a software contract is that the customer
obtains a copy of the software and the programmer keeps his status as the
proprietor; in other words, copies of the software can be, apart from cases
of exclusive licences, delivered to an unlimited number of people. Under a
sale of goods contract, the property in the goods passes to the purchaser
and the seller in principle has no control over the use of the goods.
Therefore, it is submitted that a software contract is not a contract for the
sale of goods and, so, the Sale of Goods Act does not apply to software
contracts. This submission saves the effort of arguing whether software is
classifiable under "goods" for the sake of applying the Sale of Goods Act
since a software contract is not a sale contract in the first place.
The second possible classification deals with a software transaction
as a transaction made under two contracts, namely, the supply of software
contract and the licence contract. The proprietor will warrant the proper
functionality of the software and also grant the transferee a licence to use
it. This possibility does not suggest a separate contract for the transfer of
ownership in the physical medium. '6 It rather provides for two other
contracts: a contract for the supply of software, which is concerned with its
functionality, and a licence contract, which draws the scope of the
transferee's authority to utilise the software.
Nevertheless, making two contracts for one transaction does not
seem realistic. Here the transferee pays one price for acquiring conforming
software to use. This may lead us to the third possibility, i.e., one contract
with two elements: supply and licence. This possibility creates a new type
of contract which we are unfamiliar with. This might be necessary in the
light of rapid developments in information technology. In the Scottish
case, Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd. v. Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd. 17 Lord
Penrose suggested that, although the supply of proprietary software for a
price may involve elements of nominate contracts such as a sale, it would
be inadequately understood if expressed wholly in terms of any of the
nominate contracts. Lord Penrose obviously was against the idea of
place at a future time or subject to some condition later to be fulfilled the contract is called an agreement to
sell. II
16 Therefore, Section 202 of the United States Copyright Act should not be understood as suggesting two
contracts for the software transaction. The Section states "ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy of phonorecord in which the work is first fixed,
does not of itself convey any rights in the copyright work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an
agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey
property rights in any material object."
17 [1996] S.L.T. 604.
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concluding two contracts for the software transaction. This approach, it is
submitted, brings the law in line with reality.
The application of Lord Penrose's opinion to cases where software is
obtained from a retailer, but not directly from the programmer, may need
further discussion. The retailer guarantees the proper functionality of the
software and transfers the licence that states the scope of utility allowed to
the customer. The programmer, but not the retailer, issues the licence. The
retailer has no control over the terms of the licence attached to, or enclosed
in, the package. 18 Does this mean that, where a customer obtains the
software from a retailer, there will be two contracts, i.e., the supply
contract between the customer and the retailer and the licence contract
between the customer and the programmer? The present writer has no
doubt that the answer is in the positive. The main issue here is whether the
requirement of consideration is satisfied.
In certain cases the customer may be required to register the licence
in return for information about upgrade. In most cases the licence takes the
form of the so-called shrink-rap agreement. Under this agreement the
customer will be bound by the terms of the licence at the time he uses the
software. The enforceability of such a licence is in debate. 19 Although the
enforceability issue is outside the scope of this paper, it should be noted
that the purchaser expects such a licence to be delivered with the software
when he obtains the software from a retailer. The requirement of
consideration is satisfied as the user obtains the authority to use the
software and the programmer keeps the property in the software in order to
gain more revenue by delivering copies to other users. Privity will not be
an obstacle since the customer and programmer will be parties to a direct
collateral contract, i.e., the licence agreement. If this view is accepted, the
customer will be in two contractual relationships with the retailer and the
programmer. As for the defective functionality of the software, the
customer will have the choice to sue the retailer or the programmer or
both. If the retailer is sued alone, he may shift the liability up the chain of
contracts till it reaches the programmer.
An argument may be advanced on the basis of analogy between a
software contract and a sale of books contract. A book, like a software CD,
contains copyrighted information and its sale does not affect the
IS N. Kawawa, "Contract Law Relating to Liability for Injury Caused by Information in Electronic Fonn:
Classification of Contracts - A Comparative Study, England and US" (2000) I The Journal ofInformation, Law
and Technology (JILT). section 4. Available at <http://www.law.wawick.ac.ukljilt/OO-l/kawawa.htmb.
19 R. Bradgate, "Beyond the Millennium - The Legal Issues: Sale of Goods Issues and the Millennium Bug"
(1999) 2 The Journal of1nformation, Law and Technology (JILT) section 3.3.4.
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intellectual property. The copyright in the content remains in the author;
the book, as a physical item, is owned by the buyer. Therefore, it might be
argued that there is no need to discuss whether there is a collateral contract
between the customer and the programmer. However, this argument
cannot be accepted since the customer does not need a licence to read the
book whereas the use of software requires a licence.2o
B. Software Transmitted Electronically (Electronic Software)
Although the classification of a software contract was not the key
point in St. Albans City and District Council v. International Computers
Ltd./ l Sir lain Glidewell pointed out that a sale of software delivered
electronically is not a sale of goods.22 Contracts of electronic software do
not fall under the Sale of Goods Act 1979.23
In most contracts of electronic software the transferee downloads the
software online. This will take us to the third possibility of classification,
i.e., a contract with two elements, as previously discussed. Such a contract,
it is submitted, is of a unique nature that involves two elements, namely,
the supply of conforming software and a licence to use the software. It is
also common that a retailer installs software directly on the customer's
computer. If this becomes the case, there will be, it is submitted, two
contracts: the supply contract between the customer and the retailer and
the licence contract between the customer and the programmer.
Nevertheless, the European Union ("EU") made a unified
classification of electronic software contracts. The E-Commerce
20 Ibid.. at section 3.3.2.
21 [1996] 4 All E.R. 481. For a detailed analysis of this case, see A. White, "Caveat Vendor? A Review of the
Court of Appeal Decision in St. Albans City and District Council v. International Computers Limited"
Commentary (1997) 3 The Journal of Information. Law and Technology (JILT) <http://elj.
warwick.ac.uk/jilt/cases/97_3stal>. The facts of this case can be summarised as follows. The plaintiff, a local
authority, had contracted with the defendants for the provision and installation of software to enable the local
authority to create a database of eligible poll tax payers. The software contained an error so that the figure
submitted to central government was overstated and the local authority, therefore, suffered loss. The local
authority brought an action for damages.
22 Similar view can be found in Eurodynamics Ltd v. General Automation Ltd. 6 September 1988 (Unreported),
QBD. Quoted in N. Kawawa, op.cit.
23 Section 61(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 states "In this Act, unless the context or subject matter otherwise
requires.. 'Goods' includes all personal chattels other than things in action and money, and in Scotland all
corporeal movables except money; and in particular 'goods' includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and
things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of
sale; and includes an undivided share in goods."
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Directive24 deals with certain aspects of electronic contracting. It treats an
electronic software contract as an information society service, a concept
that was defined in the Directive of Information and Technical
Standards. 25 Under the latter Directive, "information society service" is
defined as "any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance,
by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of
services".26 Accordingly, an electronic software contract can be classified
as a service contract in the European Union.
II. Effect of Classification
In St. Albans City and District Council v. International Computers
Ltd.27 the court seemed to be in favour of treating the duty of the
programmer as more than a duty of skill and care. The court held that, in
the absence of any express term as to quality or fitness for purpose or any
term to the contrary, the contract for a transfer into a computer of a
programme, intended by both parties to instruct or enable the computer to
achieve specified functions, is subject to an implied term that the
programme will be reasonably fit for its intended use, i.e., reasonably
capable of achieving the intended purpose. A similar approach can be
found in Saphena Computing Ltd. v. Allied Collection Agencies Ltd. 28
Seemingly, the programmer is required to supply software that is fit
for its intended use. The English authorities may impose such a
requirement, regardless of the classification of the contract, in order to
bring about justice. In Samuels v. Davis,29 the court relied on the
relationship between the parties and the purpose of the contract to state
24 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal
Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive
on Electronic Commerce), OJ 178, 17.7.2000.
25 Article 2(a) of the Electronic Commerce Directive.
" Article I of the "Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998, laying
down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations," OJ L 204,
21.7.98, as amended by the "Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and ofthe Council of20 July 1998,"
OJ L 217, 5.8.98.
[1996] 4 All E.R. 481.
28 [1995] F.S.R. 616; see also IBA v. EMI Electronics and BICC Construction Ltd. (1980) 14 BLR 9.
29 [1943] I K.B. 527. In this case the defendant who was a dental surgeon sued for the price of a denture. The
defendant claimed that the denture was unsatisfactory and the plaintiff should have supplied a denture of
satisfactory quality, regardless of whether the contract was for sale of goods or for work done and materials
supplied.
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that the duty of the dentist was to achieve reasonable success in the work
done, provided that there was reasonable co-operation from the patient.
One may argue that the approach adopted in St. Albans and Saphena
suggests that software contracts include an implied warranty of quality
similar to the warranty of quality provided by statutes concerning sale of
goods contracts and, hence, paying attention to the classification of
software contracts is pointless. However, it should be noted that the
implied term found in St. Albans and Saphena may not be always available
in cases of software contracts. For example, in Stephenson Blake
(Holdings) Ltd. v. Streets Heaver Ltd. 30 the court imposed the duty of skill
and care rather than a duty to produce a programme fit for the intended
use. The court held that the defendant was under a contractual duty to
exercise skill and care in supplying the software. In this case the plaintiff,
who had no knowledge of computer technology, relied on the expertise of
the defendant who was in the business of providing computerised
information systems.
Moreover, the implied term of quality found in St. Albans and
Saphena is not necessarily identical to the requirement of satisfactory
quality, required by the Sale of Goods ACt.3l The term, "merchantable
quality", found in the common law, was replaced by the term, "satisfactory
quality", in cases of sale of goods. Satisfactory quality is judged with
reference to certain aspects provided by statute. Merchantable quality is
the term that can be imposed in software contracts under the common law
in accordance with the approach stated in Saphena, as discussed above.
Furthermore, the relationship between the parties in St. Albans and
Saphena may not be found in all cases, especially, in cases of standard
software. Most computer programmes are designed for generic use. Here,
a great deal is left for the court to find out the legal basis on which it can
require the software to be reasonably capable of attaining its intended use.
Certainly, the mentioned cases can be of considerable help in the case of
custom-designed software, where the programmer is aware of the exact
purpose of the software.
30 2 March 1994 (Unreported). Quoted in N. Kawawa, "Contract Law Relating to Liability for Injury Caused by
Information in Electronic Form: Classitication of Contracts - A Comparative Study. England and US," (2000)1
The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT), section 5.6. <http://www.law.wawick.ac.ukJjilt/OO-
I/kawawa.html>
]1 R. Bradgate, "Beyond the Millennium - The Legal Issues: Sale of Goods Issues and the Millennium Bug,"
(1999) 2 The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT), section 3.3.3. Available at
<http://www.law.warwick.ac.ukJjilt/99-2/bradgate.html>.
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The US Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
The United States of America has recently dealt with information
transaction as a new type of contract that needs peculiar regulation. In July
1999 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) approved and recommended that the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) be enacted in all states.32 UCITA
was revised in 2000 and 2002.33 Originally, UCITA was intended to be
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). In order to be part of
the UCC, UCITA must have been jointly approved by the NCCUSL and
the American Law Institute (ALI). Owing to some procedures, the
NCCUSL decided to approve UCITA alone as a separate Uniform Act.34
UCITA deals with transactions of computer information. Section
102(a-II) defines computer information transaction as "an agreement or
the performance of it to create, modify, transfer or license computer
information or informational rights in computer information". Section
102(10) defines computer information as:
. .. information in electronic form which is obtained from or
through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable of
being processed by a computer. The term includes a copy of the
information or any documentation or packaging associated with
the copy.
Accordingly, software contracts fall within the scope of UCITA.
Under a software licence contract, the licensee has the right to use or
access the software or information. Section 102(a-I2) defines a computer
programme as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result. The term excludes
"separately identifiable informational content". UCITA applies to all
transactions of software delivered electronically or on a diskette. It treats
the physical medium as part of the software. Indeed, the packaging of
32 C. Fendell and D. Kennedy, "UCTTA is Coming: Part Two: Practical Analysis for Licensor's Council,"
(2000) 17 Computer Law. 3.
33 The numbers and text of UCITA's provisions quoted in this work are in accordance with the 2002 revision.
The text of UCITA 2002 and its official comments are available at <http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm>.
34 T. Cox, "Chaos versus Uniformity: the Divergent Views of Software in the International Community," (2000)
4 Vindohona Journal olInternational Commercial Law and Arhitration 3, section TV(A). Available at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/cox.html>.
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computer information is within the meaning of "computer information", as
mentioned above.35 UCITA applies to both standard and custom-designed
software.
Absent UCITA, 36 the courts distinguish between two types of
contract, i.e., a sale of goods contract and a service contract, depending on
various tests, such as the predominant factor test and the gravamen test.
Under the former test the court looks at the core subject-matter of the
transaction in question. In other words, under this test the UCC applies to
transactions of sale of goods and supply of services, provided that the
services are incidental.37 Under the gravamen test the applicable rules
depend on whether the action is brought because of defective goods or
defective services. The UCC applies to cases of defective goods, whereas
actions for defective services are dealt with under the common law?8
UCITA makes it clear that software is not a kind of goods. Section
102(a-33) defines goods as "all things that are movable at the time relevant
to the computer information transaction" and states that the term does not
include "computer information" or "general intangibles". Furthermore, in
a number of cases, the courts have decided that computer information and
informational rights are not goods.39
In practice a transaction may involve more than one type of contract.
For example, a single contract may include a transfer of property in a
machine and a supply of software. In the same transaction an intellectual
property may be granted.40 A contract to produce a motion picture may be
35 UCTTA also applies to access contracts and contracts of correction and support. under which services are
provided for the correction of operation problems in computer infonnation. Sec Sections 611 and 612.
36 Before UCITA writers examined the applicability of the UCC to software contracts. See A. Beckerman-
Rodau, "Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ApplyO (1986) 35 Emory Law
Journal 853; A. Beckerman-Rodau, "Computer Software Contracts: A Review of the Case Law," (1987) 21
Akron L. Rev. 45. In addition, the issue of whether software is licensed or sold was necessary for the application
of the "first sale doctrine," which allows the owner ofa copy to transfer it to somcbody else without asking the
copyright owner's permission.
37 D. Tuomey, "Weathering the Commercial Storm: Why Everyone Should Steer Clear of the Uniform
Computer Information Transaction Act", (2002) 1 The Journal olInformation Law and Technology (JILT),
section 4. Available at <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jiltl02-I/tuomey.html>. The author quotes BMC Indus. Inc. v.
Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322 (Fla. 1998).
3K N. Kawawa, op.cit. n.30 at section 6.4. The author quotes Herbert Friedman & Associates. Inc. v. Lifetime
Doors, Inc. 1989 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 15239 (N.D. Tll. 1990).
39 United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d I 109 (7 th Cir 1998); Allison v. United States, 525 U.S. 849 (1998); Specht
v. Netscape Communications Corp., 2002 WL 31166784 (Fed. CiL 2002); Fink v. DeClassic 745 F.Supp 509,
515 (N.D.III. 1990).
40 J. Carter, "Article 2B: International Perspectives," (1999) 14 JCL 54, 66. Notice of intellectual property is not
within the sphere of application ofUCTTA. Section 105(d) ofUCITA states that "this [Act] does not apply to an
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governed by more than one law, such as copyright law, the common law of
services, etc. Here, it is worth noting that every law is regulating one
aspect of the transaction. Section 103(b-l) ofVCITA provides:
If a transaction includes computer infonnation and goods, this
[Act] applies to the part of the transaction involving computer
infonnation, infonnational rights in it, and creation or
modification of it. ..
Certainly, the issue here is, not whether multiple sources of law apply but,
the extent to which every source applies in lieu of the other sources.
However, this raises the question of whether software embedded in
machinery is within the scope of VCITA or treated as part of the
machinery and, hence, falls under Article 2 of the VCC. Generally, in
cases of sale of goods containing software, the general rule is that VCITA
applies to the software and aspects of the agreement relating to the
creation, modification, access to, or transfer of the software. The VCC
applies to the aspects of the agreement related to the tangible goods.
However, this general rule may not easily apply, especially, in cases where
the use of software is not the material purpose of the transaction.
Therefore, in certain cases, a transaction of software embedded in a
machine might fall outside the sphere of application of VCITA. In
detennining the applicability of VCITA to such cases, the materiality test
must be taken into account. That is to say, in order for VCITA to apply,
software, embedded in the sold goods, must be material for their
~ . I' 41lunctlona lty.
Materiality depends on the importance of the software and the nature
of the goods sold. For example, in a transaction involving the sale of a car,
VCITA does not apply to aspects related to the software of a clock
installed in the car. However, the software embedded in a machine is
material if its access is necessary for the machine's functionality. Here, the
value of the software is not taken into account for deciding the materiality.
Where the use of the software, embedded in machinery, requires the
buyer to obtain a licence, there is no question that the software is material.
intellectual property notice that is based solely on intellectual property rights and is not part of a contract. The
effect ofsueh a notice is detennined by law other than this [Act]."
41 Section 103 (b-I) of UCITA states: "... However, if a eopy of a computer programme is contained in and sold
or leased as part of goods, this Act applies to the copy and computer programme only if. .. giving the buyer or
lessee of the goods access to or use of the programme is ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in goods of
the type sold or leased."
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Indeed, materiality is always clear if the software is separately licensed. In
other cases, to determine the materiality of software, one may look at
many factors, which have been officially stated as including:
the extent to which a computer programme's capabilities are a
material part of the appeal of the product, the extent to which
negotiation focused on that capability, the extent to which the
agreement made the programme capacity a separate focus,
whether there are significant post-transaction obligations of
programme support and the extent to which the programme is or
could be made available commercially, separate and apart from
the goods.42
Nevertheless, unless agreed otherwise, UCITA does apply to software
embedded in a computer, regardless of materiality. Section 103(B-l)
makes it clear that UCITA applies to the aspects related to software
embedded in a computer or a computer peripheral. It states:
If a transaction includes computer information and goods, this
[Act] applies to the part of the transaction involving computer
information, informational rights in it, and creation or
modification of it. However, if a copy of a computer programme
is contained in and sold or leased as part of goods, this act
applies to the copy and computer programme only if: (A) the
goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or (B) giving the
buyer or lessee of the goods access to or use of the programme is
ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in goods of the type
sold or leased.
Anyhow, parties to a software contract can expressly agree to exclude
the application of UCITA or a number of its default rules. Although
UCITA provides a comprehensive coverage of aspects related to software
transactions, parties may find that default rules are not good enough for
their interests. Parties may also agree to modify or completely avoid the
application of certain parts of UCITA.43 Furthermore, provisions of
UCITA may be slightly modified in the several states in which it is passed.
42 The official comments on Section lO3 of ucrTA.
43 B. Kobayashi, & L. Ribstein, "Uniformity, Choice of Law & Software Sales," (1999) 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
261, section III C. Available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id~215730>.
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Here, parties may agree to apply the law of the state that best suits their
interest.44
Of course, they cannot include any term in their contract that
violates fundamental public policy. If a contract contains such a term, the
court may refuse to enforce the contract or enforce the remainder of the
contract without the impermissible term; the court may also choose to limit
the application of the impermissible term to the extent that its application
will not violate fundamental public policy.45 Furthermore, the court may
not apply unconscionable terms. Section 111(a) states:
If a court as a matter of law finds a contract or a term thereof to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or limit the application
of the unconscionable term so as to avoid an unconscionable
result.
The application of DCITA is not automatic. For example, provisions
of DCITA pre-empted by federal law is not applicable to the extent of the
pre-emption.46 Moreover, where there is a contradiction between DCITA
and a consumer protection law, the latter prevails.47 Nevertheless, DCITA
must be liberally construed in order to govern the vast majority of cases of
the subject-matter regulated by its provisions.48
DCITA provides a comprehensive regulation of computer
information transaction. Formation of contract is regulated by modem
rules that take into account the rapid development of information
technology. Similar to Article 2 of the DCC, DCITA provides for
44 C. Fendell, and D. Kennedy, "UCITA is Coming: Part Two: Practical Analysis for Licensor's Council"
(2000) 17 The Computer Law. 3,4.
45 Section I05(b).
"Section 105(a) ofUCITA.
47 Section 104 of UCITA.
4R Rules of interpretation of UCITA's provisions help to expand its sphere of application. Section 106(a) states
"This [Act] must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies to: (1)
support and facilitate the realization of the full potential of computer information transactions; (2) clarify the
law governing computer information transactions; (3) enable expanding commercial practice in computer
information transactions by commercial usage and agreement of the parties; (4) promote uniformity of the law
with respect to the subject-matter of this [Act] among States that enact it; and (5) permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices in the excluded transactions through custom, usage, and agreement of the
parties."
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warranties of quality and third-party claims. Moreover, breaches and the
remedies for them are also regulated by UCITA.
UCITA emphasises the common understanding of intellectual
property protection. Section 501(b) makes it clear that the "transfer of a
COp/9 does not transfer ownership of informational rights". Transfer of
informational rights needs to be expressly agreed upon. According to an
official statement:
While obtaining ownership of a copy may give the copy owner
some rights with respects to that copy, it does not convey
ownership of the underlying intellectual property rights in a work
of authorship, a patented invention or other intellectual property.
The copy is merely a conduit for use, but not ownership, of
. h 50ng ts.
Section 50] refers to the agreement between the parties for specifying
the time and place of conveyance. If the agreement does not provide for
that time, ownership passes when the software is in existence and
identified to the contract. It is worth noting that UCITA distinguishes
between the terms "agreement,,51 and "contract".52 The former includes the
relationship between the parties in fact; this includes express terms, usage
of trade, course of dealing, and circumstances of the particular
transaction.53 The term, "contract", includes the legal obligations under the
agreement, as affected by the law.
The Applicability of the CISG to Software Contracts
The CISG is concerned with international sale of goods contracts.
The CISG does not define the term, "goods", nor does it provide examples
49 Section 102(a) of UCITA defines the tcnn, "copy," as "the medium 00 which infonnation is fixed on a
temporary or permanent basis and from which it can be perceived, produced, used, or communicated, either
directly or with the aid ofa machine or device."
50 The official comment on Section SOl ofUCITA.
51 Section 102(a) defines "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circwnstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade as
provided in this [Act]."
52 Section 102(a) defines "contract" as "the total legal obligation resulting from the parties' agreement as
affected by this [Act] and other applicable law."
53 The official comment on Section 501 ofUCITA.
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of it. Commentators define goods as movable and identifiable separate
objects. 54 It is still dubious whether the term, "goods", includes intangible
movable objects. This issue is more critical in cases of electronic software.
There is no express exclusion of software from the sphere of
application of the CISG. However, it must be noted that electronic
transmission of software was not in use at the time when the CISG was
enacted. Sale of electricity was expressly excluded from its sphere of
application. By analogy, must electronic software contracts be also
excluded on the ground that both electricity and software are intangible?
In answering this question, one must take into account the main aim
of the CISG, i.e. achievement of uniformity. Therefore, the types of sale
excluded from its sphere of application must be limited to the exceptions
mentioned in Article 2. Certainly, Article 2 states an exhaustive list and
not a list of examples.55 There is nothing in the CISG indicating that
contracts, with intangible subject-matter, do not fall within the sphere of
its application. Moreover, if all sales of intangible goods were not intended
to fall within the sphere of application of the CISG, there would be no
need for an express exclusion of the sale of electricity. Furthermore, the
CISG commentary explains that the exclusion of electricity was due to
unique problems of electricity. Tangibility of the subject-matter of a
contract, it is submitted, has nothing to do with the applicability of the
CISG. Schlechtriem points out:
... goods should be understood as widely as possible so as to
cover all objects which form the subject-matter of commercial
sales contracts... Computer programmes (software) will
therefore have to be recognised as goods falling under the CISG.
Since the 'corporeal' nature of the goods is pushed into the
background in such a case, that must also apply to the delivery,
by electronic transfer, of programmes sold.56
54 F. Diedrich. "Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law via Autonomous Interpretation: Software
Contracts and the CISG," (1996) 8 Pace Int'I L. Rev. 303,330.
55 Article 2 of the CISG states "This Convention docs not apply to sales: (a) of goods bought for personal,
family or household use, unles.; the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew
nor ought to have known that the goods were bought for any such use; (b) by auction; (c) on execution or
otherwise by authority of law; (d) of stocks, shares, investment securities. negotiable instruments or money; (e)
of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft; (f) of electricity."
" P. Schlechtriem, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Oxford
1998), p.23. The argument applies similarly to cases of standard software and custom-designed software since
Article 3( 1) of the CISG states: "Contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced are to be
considered sales unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials
necessary for such manufacture or production."
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Less inconsistency among legal writers can be found in cases where
software is delivered by the use of a physical medium, e.g., diskette or
CD.57 In such a case scholars may argue that a software contract is a sale
contract. 58 This argument considers the disk as the subject-matter of the
contract and, hence, the issue of software does not come into the picture.
In other words, this transaction can be treated as a sale of tangible
movables, which is the subject-matter of the CISG. As previously
discussed, this view does not take the reality of the transaction into
consideration. The subject-matter of the transaction is the software and not
the medium. Indeed, the medium is nothing more than a container.
Of course, the case is different where software is embedded in
machinery, such as televisions, cars, etc. In such cases there is no question
about the applicability of the CISG to such items since the subject-matter
of the transaction is the machinery; and the software is only incidental.
Here, software is used in working the machinery without being separated
from it. The CISG applies to sale of the whole item and not to its parts
separately.59
Needless to say, under the sale of goods transaction, the seller is
obligated to transfer the property in the goods.60 According to Lookofsky,
this applies to the sale of software where a property in a copy of a
programme is transferred, regardless of the means of delivery.6l
Lookofsky also argues that the protection of software by copyright rules
does not affect the classification of the contract as a sale contract. Such
rules prevent the buyer from making copies of the programme without the
permission of the seller. But, this does not change the fact that the subject-
matter of the contract, i.e., the individual copy purchased, is a kind of
goods. 62
57 T. Cox, "Chaos Versus Uuiformity: the Divergent Views of Software in the International Community,"
(2000) 4 Vindobona Journal ofInternational Commercial Law and Arbitration 3, para.ll.A.2.
58 J.W. Carter, "Article 2B: International Perspectives," (1999) 14 JCL 54, 67.
59 The CISG does not apply to access contract. Under this type of contract, there is no transfer of a property right
in a movable object. It does not seem possible for such a contract to fall within the sphere of application of the
CISG.
60 Article 30 of the CISG states: "The seller must deliver the goods, hand over any documents relating to them
and transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and this Convention."
61 J. Lookofsky, "In Dubio Pro Conventione? Some Thoughts about opt-outs. Computer Programmes and pre-
emption under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG)," (2003) 13 Duke .J.Comp.& In!'1 L. 263,276.
62 Ibid., at p.277.
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However, deciding whether software is a kind of goods or not may
not be the only obstacle facing the application of the CISG. The question
here is whether a software contract can be classified as a sale contract in
the first place. Indeed, under normal circumstances, property in the
software does not pass to the transferee. Even if we agree with Lookofsky
that the copy of the software constitutes goods, the reality of the bargain is
that the transferee usually has nothing more than the right to use the copy
and he cannot transfer it to others. This is why, it is submitted, the CISG
does not apply to software contracts. In this area its application is limited
to the case where software, embedded in machinery, is incidental and not
the core subject-matter of the transaction.
Conclusions
The traditional classification of a contract as sale or service does not
seem to be adequately applicable to a software contract. Such a contract
may involve aspects of nominate contracts; but, it is, it is submitted, a new
type of contract that involves two elements: the supply of software and the
licence. Where the customer obtains the software from a retailer and its
licence from the programmer, the customer may be involved in two
contractual relationships with the retailer and the programmer.
Means of delivery, whether electronic or via a physical medium,
should have no effect on the classification of a software contract. Although
delivery via a physical medium, such as a diskette, appears as performance
of a sale of goods contract, one should not ignore the fact that the actual
subject-matter of the transaction is the software and not the medium.
Indeed, ignoring the means of delivery for the purpose of classifying a
software contract brings the law in line with reality. However, the case is
different where software is not the core subject-matter of the transaction
and supplied as part of certain machinery. In such cases the machinery is
the core subject-matter of the transaction rather than a physical medium.
Here the software, it is submitted, must be dealt with as part of the subject-
matter of the contract, under which the machinery is delivered.
Under the classification of one contract with two elements, a
software contract will be governed by common-law rules of contract. In
other words, deciding whether or not there is an implied warranty that the
software will be fit for its intended purpose depends on the relationship
between the parties and, hence, will be decided in accordance with the
circumstances of each case. This may not be helpful in cases of standard
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software designed for generic use. Therefore, it is submitted, new
regulations are needed to provide implied warranties of quality.
According to the E-Commerce Directive, software delivered
electronically is a kind of service. Under service contracts there is only a
duty of skill and care. This does not, it is submitted, deal with the reality of
a software transaction since the transferee usually expects the software to
be defect-free, regardless of the programmer's skill and care.
UCITA is a comprehensive uniform law that regulates software
contracts and takes into account their specific nature. It applies to standard
and custom-designed software contracts, regardless of their means of
delivery. UCITA provides for warranties of quality and third-party claims.
It can be noted that UCITA is an updated version of the UCC, set up to
deal with the rapid development in information technology.
The rapid development in the field of information technology pushes
for an update of laws at both domestic and international levels. Serious
obstacles make the CISG, it is submitted, inapplicable to software
contracts. The CISG is concerned with sale of goods; a number of
prominent writers argue that software can be considered as goods under
the CISG and, hence, software contracts are within its sphere of
application. However, the intangibility of software is not the only obstacle
facing the application of the CISG. The question here is whether a
software contract is a sale contract in the first place. While property passes
to the buyer under the sale contract, property usually does not pass under a
software contract. Furthermore, there is an obvious difference between a
software contract and a sale contract in terms of the limited utility of
software allowed for the transferee. Therefore, it is submitted,
modification of the CISG or a new convention is needed to regulate the
international software contract.
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